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Drafi Recont nendarion
on the development of a European spue-based obsemalion sysbm 
- 
Pafi III
The Assembly,
(i) Sfessing the importance of control over space beyond the earth's atmosphere in the global mana-
gement of crises;
(ii) Noting that Europe still does not have operational means of observation and detection by satellite
with the military capabilities necessary for srengthening is defence;
(iii) Stressing the need for the WEU countries to equip themselves with independent space-based means
of observation and detection in order to be able to take appropriate measures in the event of crises affec-
ting Europe's interests;
(iv) Concerned over the future implications for European security of the proliferation of balli5liss tesh-
nology in the Mediterranean region;
(v) Recalling Recommendations 410, 482,523,533 and 555 in which the Assembly requests that the
Council:
(a) set clear European space policy objectives and priorities;
(b) reach decisions on further steps for establishing a full-scale European verification satellite sys-
tem;
(c) design the planned system in such a way as to contribute to the security of WEU member coun-
tries and to be useful to other organisations with a European, Atlantic or intemational vocation;
(d) assess without delay the risks to Europe stemming from the proliferation of ballistic and
nuclear technology;
(e) t*e appropriate decisions to avoid the slowing-down or paralysis of activities entrusted to the
study management team and the industrial consortium commissioned to design WEU's main
observation system;
(vi) Sfessing the importance of equipping Europe with early-warning and navigational satellite systems
necessary for the efficient operation of a European anti-missile defence system;
(vii) Aware of the high cost of space-based systems and the need for close co-operation between states,
industry and scientific circles for these projects to succeed;
(vili) Noting with regret the absence of consensus in the Council over the necessary development of the
work of the satellite centre and starting the programme for the main observation system;
(ix) Deploring that the Council provides so little and such inadequate information on WEU's space policy,
RecoNtr\,8l,[Ds rH/6(T rne Cowcu.
1. Commence examination of a European space defence policy, taking all aspects of the problem into
account;
2. Take the decisions necessary for the development of the satellite centre and for starting work on the
main observation system, on the basis of a strategic analysis of what is at stake in the medium and long
tenn;
3. Instruct its Space Group to begin a study of a European space-based defence system, paylng particu-
lar attention to the need for communications, early-warning and navigational satellites and their protection;
4. Develop its contacts with the space industries of the member countries and with ESA in order to
obtain information on current programmes and technologies that might be useful for implementing a
European space-based defence system;
5. Foster co-operation in early-warning and navigational satellites with the United States and Russia
on a basis of reciprocig and without jeopardising the independence of European systems;
6. Examine the expediency of creating a European space defence agency in WEU with responsibility
in this area;
7. Keep the Assembly better informed of its decisions on WEU's space policy.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submiaed by Mn Vallcir, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
1. Space questions are a perrnanent thread
running through the debates and activities of the
Assembly of WEU. In recent years, the interest in
space-related issues has led to quite considerable
progress in terms of practical achievements.
2. In the early nineties, events in Europe and
in the Gulf led to a vigorous resurgence of the
debate on the expediency of Europer having a
space-based observation system allowing it to
affrm its r6le as a world power.
3. With the signature of the CFE-I and CFE-
lA agreements, the question of the verification
and control of the process of arms reduction in
Europe assumed paramount importance since on
its reliability depended the success of commit-
ments entered into by the two opposing military
alliances, the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw
Pact.
4. The European states, primarily concerned
by this process, found themselves in a somewhat
uncomfortable position, being dependent largely
on American satellite data2, which led to difficul-
ties over sharing the information thus gathered.
This situation helped to intensify discussions on
the need for Europe to have its own observation
satellites for military purposes.
5. This was the context in which a sympo-
sium, organised by the Assembly of WEU on the
subject 'o Observation satellites 
- 
a European
means of verifying disarmament " was held in
Rome on27th and 28th March 1990, during the
course of which the different aspects of the ques-
tion were examined in depth3. Following this ini-
tiative, the Technological and Aerospace Com-
mittee submitted a report on the findings of the
symposium at the June 1990 session, which was
adopted by the Assembly.
6. In Recommendation 482, resulting from
this report, the Assembly stressed " the need for
Westem European nations to develop an autono-
mous European verification satellite capability in
1. The word Europe is used here to designate the European
Union, WEU and European members of NAIO.
2. With the exception of France, which has a space policy
independent of those of the then major powers.
3. Observation satellites 
- 
a European means of veriffing
disarmament; Symposium, Rome, 27th and 28th March
1990, Ofhce of the Clerk of the Assembly of WEU.
order to meet their responsibilities in a changing
security situation... ". [t recommended that the
Council " decide as a matter of urgency on the
establishment of a WEU satellite image-proces-
sing and interpretation agency; " and'o reach deci-
sions on further steps for establishing a full-scale
European verification satellite system without
delay... "4.
7. The Council replied positively to the
recommendation, stating that a group of experts
had been tasked to make concrete proposals and
that a detailed report had been submitted to the
Council and adopted at its meeting of 1Oth
December 1990. It stated also that " the establish-
ment of a WEU satellite centre ... would be an
important factor in European co-operation on
space-based observation. "
8. Moreover " feasibility studies should also
be launched so that a European satellite sur-
veillance system can be set up without delay, with
a view to the verification of arms conffol agree-
ments and to the monitoring of crises and ecologi-
cal problems. "s.
9. The will expressed to make progress in
military space matters was largely due to the Gulf
crisis and the lessons drawn from it regarding the
use of observation satellites and the conduct of
military operations. Participation of European
forces in monitoring the embargo and subsequent-
ly in air- and land-based actions revealed how
very dependent they were on satellite intelligence
supplied by the United States. This contributed to
awareness of the need to act at European level in
order to be able to respond to future crises using
European space-based means. The relative
detachment of the United States in the face of the
crisis in former Yugoslavia also served to streng-
then these views.
10. Thus the Council, meeting at Vianden
(Luxembourg) on 27 th June 1 99 1, decided to'o set
up a satellite data interpretation centre whose
immediate task would be to train European
experts ... to compile and process accessible data
and to make those data available to member
states, particularly within the framework of verifi-
cation ... crisis-monitoring and environmental
monitoring. " Moreover, the ad hoc Sub-Group on
Space was assigned the task of pursuing " studies
4. Document 1230,25th May 1990; Rapporteur: Mr. Lenzer.
5. Document 1276,29th May 1991, reply of the Council to
Recommendation4S2.
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on the possibilities for medium- and long-term
co-operation on a European satellite observation
system. "6.
11. The Vianden decision and the Satellite
Centre, its structure and operation have already
been mentioned in two previous reports on the
development of a European space-based observa-
tion system. With this third part, the debate is far
from being closed, but it is important to review
European achievements and co-operation in mili-
tary space matters, the better to understand what is
the way forward and the choices to be made to
make this ambitious project a reality, the success
of which will largely depend on a credible com-
mon European security and defence policy worthy
of the name.
II. Military salellite prograrnmes
12. The Gulf crisis provided a graphic illustra-
tion of the use of satellites, both civil and military,
in crisis-management and the conduct of military
operations. Intensive use of this medium contribu-
ted greatly to the success of the United Nations
coalition and the very low loss of life and equip-
ment on the United Nations side.
13. Of the range of hardware usedo covering a
wide spread of tasks: observation, monitoring,
communications, navigation and meteorology,
two tlpes of satellites played a major r6le: optical
or radar intelligence satellites and communica-
tions satellites.
14. The former enabled continuous monitoring
of haqi mititary forces on the ground, either by
identifying strategic targets (command centres, air
and missile bases, industrial complexes, etc.) or
military detachments in the theatre of operations,
identifying their equipment and the number of
personnel.
15. The latter provided contact between the(political) decision-making centres and the mili-
tary units based in the Gulf area, thousands of
miles apart, and allowed orders to be relayed and
action reports to be received in real time.
16. This system of observation and communi-
cation satellites operating in tandem emerged as
one of the aspects necessary for the conduct of
peace-keeping or peace-enforcement missions,
sometimes taking place at vast distances from
decision-making centres and sometimes in geo-
graphic and climatic environments somewhat
hostile to the direct presence of military units or
their presence in sufficient number (lack of for-
ward positions, for example).
6. Document 1282, l4th October 1991: first part of the thir-
ty-seventh annual report of the Council 
- 
communiqu6 of the
WEU Ministerial Council on27th June 1991,
(i) Obsem$ion and communbatians satellites
t7. The military uses of space are very varied
and can be summarised briefly as follows: infor-
mation-gathering, telecommunications, naviga-
tion (global positioning system), meteorology,
oceanography, space-based surveillance (analysis
and identification of orbiting objects and track-
ing) and early-warning systems (anti-missile,
nuclear explosion detection), in all of which
observation and communications play a very
important r6le.
(a) Observarton systems
18. There are basically two fypes of observa-
tion system: optical and radar. In the first group
are satellites with visible optical and/or infrared
sensors with various degrees of resolution,
approximately ten metres in the case of the Euro-
pean Spot satellite, one metre in the case of the
Helios 1 satellite and less than a metre for the
American systems KeyHole, KH I 1 and KH 115?.
Optical reconnaissance satellites are nonetheless
subject to two limitations: first, atmospheric
turbulence imposes a resolution limit of some
10-15 cm; second, and not the least important,
they can be used only in clear weather. These
satellites are primarily strategic intelligence tools.
19. Radar observation provides images of a dif-
ferent nature and texture to those of visible
images. For example, radar imaging allows one to
detect camouflaged or buried targets which would
have remained undetected by optical satellites and
also barbed wire networks or certain decoys.
Resolution varies, that of the American Lacrosse
satellite lies within a range of 0.60 to 3 metres t.
The radar satellite's all-weather capability makes
it a prime tactical intelligence instrument and a
necessary complement of the optical satellite. The
limitations of this system are its high cost, its pro-
cessing requirements on the ground and the dffi-
culty of interpreting radar images.
(b) Communications
20. Satellites provide communications over
very long distances, without requiring rigid infra-
sfructure. The two main types of satellites are tele-
communications and relay satellites. The frst of
these may be geostationary,-in other words statio-
nary over a given point of the globe, or non-geo-
stationary; in the case of geostationary satellites,
communications can be transmitted inside its area
of radio-electrical cover; in the case of non-geo-
stationary satellites, communications are disconti-
nuous 
- 
the satellite receives signals from a given
point and retransmis them while overflying another.
7. lntemational Defense & Technologies, No. 7, page 26,
December 1991.
8. Idem.
4
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21. Geostationary relay-satellites transmit bet-
ween low-satellites in low orbit and a satellite
data-receiving station situated at a point on earth.
Thus, three relay satellites orbiting around the
earth provide a constant link between the observa-
tion satellite and a land-based receiving station.
22. Satellite communications have distinct
qualitative advantages over earth-bound commu-
nications as follows:
- 
increased projection capability over very
short spaces of time, while remaining in
contact with decision-making centres;
- 
ability to offer high-capacity, good qual-
ity communications;
- 
ability to guarantee secure links, even in
the event of aggression;
- 
possibility of broadcasting information
to isolated units over vast geographic
areas.
23. Military satellite communications have
existed in Europe for more than twenty years. The
British Skynet programme launched in 1969 was
the first, followed by NATO in 1976, France's
Syracuse system in 1984 and Spain's Hispasat/
Secomsat n 1992.
(ii) Natianal military spam programmes in Europe
24. Research and development of civil and
military space-based systems is a long-term and
extremely costly process, the outcome of which is
uncertain. For a space programme to be success-
fuI, the necessary human, technical and financial
resources must be made available and the aims of
the programme clearly defined.
25. In WEU, only France and the United King-
dom have space-based military programmes that
are operational. These cover telecommunications
and, in the case ofFrance, observation by satellite.
Spain and Italy have also embarked on studies and
programmes for acquiring space-based facilities
for military use in a more modest framework and,
frequently, in co-operation with other countries.
(a) France
26. France's military space policy was specifi-
cally designed to be independent of the space-
based capabilities of the United States and Russia.
Moreover, its telecommunications and observa-
tion satellites provide links betrveen metropolitan
France and French military forces stationed in
many regions of the world thousands of kilo-
metres distant.
27. To these considerations of a political and
military nature are added a major research and
development component, the economic spin-off
from which is substantial and has made France a
civilian and military space power in Europe.
(i) The Syracuse programme
28. ln 19@ the French D6l6gation minist6riel-
le pour l'armement started the first studies on
satellite systems for military use. However, it was
not until 1979 that the flrst French military space
telecommunications programme, known as Syra-
cuse (radio communications system by satellite),
came into operation.
29. This system's first military payload was
taken on board the civilian satellite Telecom I on
lst August 1984. Further launches followed in
1985 (Telecom IB) and 1988 (Telecom IC). The
Syracuse II programme was launched in 1988.
This involved an improved telecommunications
payload on board Telecom tr satellites commis-
sioned in late 1991.
(ii) The Helios programme
30. ln 1977 the preliminary studies were car-
ried out for the Samro military optical observation
satellite, in parallel with the launch of the Spot
civilian prograrnme, which obtained 3OVo fundng
from the ministry of defence.
31. 1986 saw the start of the Helios program-
me, which was opened to co-operation from Italy
n 1987 (l4Eo) and Spain in 1988 (7Vo).T"he first
Helios observation satellite is to be launched in
February 1995. A Helios II programme is being
studied, but financial difficulties are an obstacle
to its implementation (costs are in the region of 8
billion francs and, to date, no other European
country has come forward as a parrrer). Helios tr
is scheduled to be launched into orbit by the year
2000 and could have a resolution of 50 cm (com-
pared with 1 metre for Helios tr).
32. Alongside the Syracuse and Helios pro-
grammes, France has commenced design studies
for the Osiris and Zenon satellites. Osiris is a
high resolution radar observation satellite for
specific observation tasks, on a continuous basiso
irrespective of atmospheric conditions. Osiris
will be fuly complementary to the Helios optical
observation satellites. France wishes other Euro-
pean countries to become associated with the
project, especially Germany, to which overtures
have been made.
33. Zenon is a military elecffonic surveillance
satellite providing electromagnetic surveillance
for collecting data on the preparation of military
operations and locating radars. Unlike Osiris,
where European co-operation is to be invited,
Znnon, because of its specific tasks, is intended
solely for national use.
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(b) The United Kingdom
34. Unlike France, which is committed to a
complex military space prograrnme, the United
Kingdom has concentrated its efforts on military
space-based telecommunications through the
Skynet programme.
35. Studies were carried out in the sixties on a
system of telecommunications by satellite. In
1969 and 1970, the two satellites in the frst gene-
ration, Skynet [, were launched, but the second
launch failed. In January and November 1974,
Skynet II satellites replaced the frst generation
which ceased to be operationaln 1972.
36. In 1980, the decision was taken to produce
the Skynet IV series, Skynet III having never
materialised.ln 1982, the Falklands war contribu-
ted to revealing the gaps in British satellite com-
munications. Only one Skynet II satellite was
operational at the time and was poorly placed to
cover the route to the Falklands followed by Bri-
tish naval forces. To guarantee communications,
the United Kingdom had to use American space-
based facilities and it would seem that the United
States also provided the United Kingdom with
satellite images of the region.
37 . Awareness of this deficiency contributed to
the development of the Skynet fV system and to a
study being launched on a space-based intelli-
gence satellite, the Zircon programme, which
seems to have been abandoned in 1987'. Three
Skynet [V satellites were launched in 1988, 1989
and 1990 and were used during the Gulf crisis to
provide communications between British forces
stationed in the region and the United Kingdom.
38. lnlgg(,contracts were signed for the deve-
lopment and launch of two new Skynet fV satel-
lites (series 2) and studies were begun on a new
generation, Skynet V, to replace Skynet fV next
century. According to the United Kingdom autho-
rities European co-operation will be invited for
this new project.
39. Nor has the United Kingdom neglected
space-based observation, as might be assumed
from a comparison of its progress in space-based
technology with that of France. ln point of fact,
the British presence in this field is assured by
close collaboration with the United States.
40. This collaboration takes place partly at the
level of industry, the British technology and
defence industries having a long tradition of co-
operation with their American counterpartsl0, and
9. According to certain sources, Zircon may have been laun-
ched under cover of a Skynet [V satellite and could well be
operational 
- 
Military Terhnology, Volume XVI, No. 6/92,
page 17.
10. The United Kingdom was the United States'initial foreign
partnerforprojecs linked to ttre strategic defence initiative and
has co-operated in subsequent anti-missile defence projects.
partly through intelligence within the framework
of the 1947 agreements on co-ordination of intel-
ligence-gathering. In this area the British authori-
ties probably receive information from various
American optical and radar observation, sur-
veillance and early-warning satellites. The United
Kingdom thus has satellite intelligence at its dis-
posal without having to bear alone the manage-
ment and maintenance costs of a space-based
observation system.
(c) Spain and ltaly
4I. (i) The Hispasat/Secomsat programme is
Spain's first space-based telecommunications
pioject for civil and military use. It consists of
ihree satellites (two operational and a third in
reserve), together with the ground-based logistics
necessary for receiving and processing the data
obtained. The two satellites were launched by
Ariane rocket in September 1992 and July 1993.
Spain has thus acquired a communications system
similar to the French Syracuse system, in other
words a civilian satellite supplemented by compo-
nents for military use. Hispasat/Secomsat has had
its baptism of fre in Bosnia-Herzegovina where it
relays communications between the Spanish
UNPROFOR forces and Spain.
42. (ii) The Italian Sicral project is a satellite
telecommunications programme with defence and
civil protection applications. Participation of Ita-
lian forces in United Nations operations in Bos-
nia-Herzegovina, Mozambique and Somalia has
revealed the need for a satellite communications
system to monitor their action. The Sicral system
will provide national, European and international
cover of Italian armed forces and will be managed
from ground-based military control stations under
the supervision of Italy's combined headquarters.
In principle, it should be operational before the
year 2000.
43. In spite of the efforts and progress achie-
ved, it is clear that no European country alone is
able to acquire a minimal military satellite system
providing adequate space-based cover for its
national defence requirements. Only France is
pushing forward on all fronts, but with increas-
ingly limited resources. Co-operation between
European countries will be an unavoidable neces-
sity if any savings are to be made in the cost of
progrtunmes and overlapping national systems are
to give way to a European military space-based
policy.
III. Prospectsfor co-operalion in Earope
4. European countries (in the broad sense)
have developed co-operation networks for mili-
tary and civilian programmes at both state and
industry level with varying degrees of success.
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Europeans are carrying out joint space pro-
grammes, both at international level with Intelsat
and Inmarsat, and at regional level with ESA, in
fields ranging from earth observation to meteoro-
logy and including environmental and sea-bed
monitoring, telecommunications, etc.
45. The results are far less impressive on the
military side, largely due to differences in percep-
tion. France sees space-based technology, (toge-
ther with nuclear weapons) as the means of affir-
ming its status as a regional and international
political and military power, hence its military
space prograrrrme, which is backed by a viable
industrial base (A6rospatiale and Mafta, to name
but two companies, are at the forefront of techno-
logy in the field, not merely in Europe but in the
rest of the world as well) and a national vision of
the military use of space r'.
46. The United Kingdom is engaged in three-
pronged development of its military space activi-
ties: the Skynet telecommunications sateUite (of
United Kingdom design), NATO (the NATO
satellites are replicas ofthe Skynet satellites) and
co-operation with the United States. This last
aspect enables the United Kingdom to share mili-
tary space technologies and information with the
United States, as for instance in the framework of
anti-missile defence.
47. In June l994,for example, two microsatel-
lites, STRV-IA and STRV-IB (space technology
research vehicles), manufactured by the British
Defence Research Agency were launched by
Ariane rocket, with American Ballistic Missile
Defence Organisation'2 experimental material on
board.
48. Limited financial and technical capabilities
or doubts in the face of challenges offered by the
milita.ry use of space make it diffrcult for the other
European countries to engage in real co-operation
and the formulation, in the longer term, of a Euro-
pean military space policy.
(i) Co-operaian between WEU countriBs
49. Of the WEU member countries, four are
currently engaged in or have plans for military
space-based observation and telecommunications
prograrnmes: France, Italy, Spain and the United
Kingdom. The other members also have a pre-
sence, since all of them participate in the activities
I 1. Medium- and long-term forecasts for space are drawn up
by the Groupe d'6tudes spatiales (Special Study Group) of
the Ministry of Defence and compiled in a classified docu-
ment, the Plan Pluriannuel Spatial Militaire (long-term mili-
tary space plan). The first version of this plan dates back to
1984 and the plan is updated every two years.
12. The body which succeeded the Strategic Initiative
Defence Organisation n 199l-1992 and which is responsible
for study and design of anti-missile defence in the United
States.
of the WEU Satellite Centre and the work of the
study management team 13.
(a) Inter-stateco-operation
50. The Helios observation programme was the
first real test of European co-operation in military
space-based observation satellites, bringing toge-
ther France, Italy and Spain. The Helios project
was launched by France in 1986, joined by Italy
and Spain (with their respective contributions of
l4Vo andTVo of the financing of the overallbudget
of F 8-10 billion. Helios's specification (resolu-
tion of I metre as compared with approximately
l0 metres for Spot) makes it unique in Europe and
it is surprising that France and its Helios program-
me have not attracted the interest of other partners
within WEU 
- 
doubtless because of political and
economic considerations.
51. Nevertheless, the success of co-operation
in the framework of Helios I appears to be a spe-
cial case, considering the fate of Helios II. France
has not, in point of fact, succeeded in finding
other partners for this second generation satellite,
incorporating technologies more advanced than
those of its predecessorra, as Italy and Spain did
not wish to commit themselves to it.
52. The Osiris radar satellite project seems
likely to be of interest to Germany but no concrete
decisions have been taken. Moreover, the cost of
German reunification, which has already had
implications for the budget and various ESA pro-
grarnmes, has put a brake on any major commit-
ments by that country to civilian and military
space developments.
53. However, the possibility acknowledged by
the Constitutional Courtls of German military
units being posted outside the NATO area within
the framework of United Nations operations
raises the issue of communications and intelli-
gence and might be an argument in favour of Ger-
man participation in European observation and
communications satellite projects.
54. The United Kingdom and France also co-
operate in the Eumilsatcom and Inmilsat space
prograrnmes.
55. Eumilsatcom is a programme for a future
military satellite communications system inten-
ded to replace the Skynet and Syracuse systems in
the twenty-first century. Germany, Italy, the
13. The activities of the Satellite Centre and the study. mana-
gement team are described in a previous report of the com-
mittee: the development of a European space-based observa-
tion system 
- 
Part II, Document 1393, Rapporteur 
- 
Mr.
Valleix (Recommendation 555).
14. Helios II was supposed to have a resolution of some 50
cm which would place it at the level of American satellites of
the same category.
15. Decision of 12th July 1994.
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Netherlands and Spain have also been invited to
participate.
56. Inmilsat is an international military project
for communications by satellite'6. The United
States is also associated in this project, along with
France and the United Kingdom. Eumilsatcom
and Inmilsat are now in their study phases.
57. However, it must be acknowledged that
despite the number of projects, there are few
examples of inter-state co-operation and those
that exist would appear to result from a case-by-
case approach rather than an overall strategy for
the future, due to the lack of a common perception
of the challenges involved in the military use of
space and its advantages for a defence Europe. In
the framework of WEU, an embryonic form of
space-based co-operation has been started with
the establishment of the WEU Satellite Cenhe and
the pursuit of a feasibility study on a satellite
observation system.
(b) WEU's main observation system
58. Alongside the Satellite Cenfre, whose pre-
sent tasks are to demonstrate the applications of
space imagery for monitoring disarmament trea-
ties, crises and the environment, to frain a nucleus
of analysts for interpreting images and develop
computer techniques for the interpretation of
images and to supply member states with opera-
tional image interpretation products, a study
management team exists, with responsibility for
the feasibility study of WEU's main satellite
observation system.
59. This industrial consortium of thirty or so
European firms led by the German firm, Dornier
(of the DASA aerospace group) is responsible for
the feasibility study which is in two parts (appro-
ved in February and December 1993). The flrst
examines the choice of possible configurations
and the second makes a detailed technical analysis
including cost estimates of the configurations best
suited to the Centre's needs.
60. Final selection is the responsibility of the
WEU Council which is to take a decision on star-
ting the programme for an independent European
satellite system in 1995. At the ministerial mee-
ting held at the Kirchberg European Centre,
Luxembourg, on 9th May 1994, the ministers tas-
ked the WEU Space Group to prepare " a propo-
sal for decision including the preparation of a
draft memorandum of understanding containing
detailed specifications... r"'.
61. According to the conclusions of the first
part of the study, the elements of the WEU system
would be as follows:
(i) The space sector, defined as all satellites in
orbit belonging to the system, comprising:
- 
nominal satellites, operating in low orbit(660-570 km). This category includes
two optical satellites and trvo synthetic
aperture radar satellites ;
- 
small satellites (of the optical and SAR
type) operating at very low altitude as
complements to the nominal satellites.
These small satellites may have a resolu-
tion and [fe-span inferior to that of the
nominal satellites (approximately five to
seven years), but allow a greater number
of images to be taken each day across a
predetermined area. The number of these
small satellites will depend on their life-
span, the tasks assigned to them and their
availability;
- 
data-relay satellites in geostationary orbit(approximately 36 000 km) for trans-
mitting images and other data gathered
by the low orbit satellites.
62. Clearly, there must be at least two satellites
ofeach type, or better still, three (nvo operational,
one reserve) for the system to be exploited effi-
ciently. This would allow several crisis areas to be
monitored on a virtually pennanent basis.
(ii) The ground sector, including ground-based
facilities and installations necessary for control
and use of the system: operating, processing,
archiving and interpretation centres; one or more
stations for tracking, telemetry and control of the
data relay and other satellites; means of commu-
nications capable of connecting all the stations,
fiansmitting data and receiving requests for data
from political and military authorities.
(ii) Other military space prugrunmes
63. Apart from the instances of co-operation h
WEU and inter-state co-operation, other players
in the domain of military space in Western
Europe, NATO and the European space industries,
also have contributions to make.
(a) NATO and space
64. ln 1966, the Norttr Atlantic Council deci-
ded to begin a study for a NAIO satellite commu-
nications prograrnme. In 1970, the first satellite,
NATO 2A, was launched (the first phase of the
programme was devoted to research and testing).
ln 1971, phase 2 of the NATO programme, rela-
ting to ground-based facilities, was completed and
a second satellite was placed in orbit. Phase 3 led
to the development of the ground sector of the
16. Statement on the defence estimates 1994; Chapter tV 
-
defence equipment programme, page 63.
17. WEU Council of Ministers, ministerial meeting of 9th
May 1994 (Kirchberg, Luxembourg); Document 1422,24th
May 1994.
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system which today consists of over twenty fixed
and one mobile station and a fourth satellite was
launched in November 1984.
65. In January 1987, it was decided to build
new satellites based on the model of the British
Skynet satellites: NATO IV. Tlvo of these satel-
lites were launched in 1991 and 1993 and will be
operational until the year 2000, after which it will
be necessary to provide for their replacement.
66. Communications by satellite are taking on
special importance with the changes now being
made in NAIO, particularly as regards the use of
its forces in the framework of peace-keeping ope-
rations and the greater need for force mobility.
According to a document produced by the NAf,O
National Armaments Directors Group (NADs),
interoperability between national communica-
tions systems must be developed at battalion level
and below and between peace-keeping forces in
the field and command cenffes and sea- and air-
borne support forces. Communications satellites
are the ideal means of meeting these requirements
because of their wide cover and ability to protect
communicationsts.
67. However, the funre of the NATO satellite
system still hangs in the balance. Budget restric-
tions affecting infrastructure projects and the
organisation's new reform prograrnmes have rai-
sed questions about pursuing the NATO V pro-
gramme, intended to take over from the NATO IV
satellites. The suggestion that recourse might be
had to existing commercial satellites, such as
those of Inmarsat, seems increasingly plausible in
the absence of any thinking on NAIO's space
communications policy beyond the year 2000 
''g(the date on which the Skynet [V satellites beco-
me obsolete).
(b) Industrtdco-operation
68. The European space industries, although
more involved in civilian than military pro-
grarlmes, have a very important co-operative r6le
to play. The high cost of space systems, interna-
tional competition between satellite launcher
manufacturers, the appearance of new competi-
tors (particularly in Asia) are so many arguments
in favour of industrial co-operation.
69. This will not necessarily follow automati-
cally, in the absence of a medium-and long-term
policy on civilian and military space matters.
However, responsibility for defining such a policy
lies with states, while indushry must put forward
proposals regarding the systems and means neces-
sary to achieve the objectives which have been
decided. At present, Europe has a surfeit of space
18. Space News. Vol. 5: No. 27, page 2; llth-l7th July,
1994.
19. Space News, Vol. 5, No. 35, page l; l2th-l8th Septem-
ber 1994.
indusffies, sometimes in partnership, frequently in
competition. There are more satellite manufactu-
rers in Europe than in the United States for a mar-
ket I07o smaller than the American market2o.
70. Because of this, major European fir::rrs have
started a process of acquisition and mergers with
the longer-term objective of creating an industrial
space complex able to meet external competition,
particularly from the United States, on equal
terms. Ttvo examples are worth noting, the acqui-
sition of British Aerospace Space Systems (the
manufacturer of the Skynet satellites) by Matra
Marconi Space (an Anglo-French company 50Vojointly owned by Matra D6fense Espace, which
manufactures the Helios satellites, and GEC Mar-
coni) and the possible merger of the satellite divi-
sions of Deutsche Aerospace (Germany) and
A6rospatiale (France), responsible for the Helios
optical systems.
71. Ultimately, this process can only lead to
a more rational approach to space matters in
Europe, as in the case of the Ariane launcher
(Arianespace Consortium) and also the aeronau-
tics industry (Airbus). In regrouping in this way,
European indusfiry is in a good position to achieve
the necessary harmonisation of procedures and
technologies without which European co-opera-
tion in space matters cannot advance further.
72. Space industry associations bringing toge-
ther firms in several countries are also increas-
ingly involved in lobbying govemments and the
national and European space agencies (ESA).
73. Eucosat, an association made up of twenty
or so firms and parliamentarians from seven
major countries of the European Union, submitted
a project in June 1994for a European monitoring
system by dual-use (i.e. civilian and military)
satellite2r. According to Eucosat, existing or plan-
ned observation satellites have certain deficien-
cies in terms of resolution, all-weather capability
(infrared or radar) and the predictability of their
return over a given site. Moreover, present gtound
sectors are not adapted to future needs.
74. To be efficient, an observation system has
to be " open ", in other words, capable of exploi-
ting data from civilian and military satellites or
air-borne sensors. The ground component must
provide comprehensive support to the decision-
makers of Europe. The structure of the proposed
system is the classical one: optical and radar satel-
lites, small support satellites and relay satellites.
75. The system would be implemented in three
phases: the first making use of existing civil
and military capabilities (Helios and Spot, for
example), the second being the development of
new sensors and improving the processing and
Defense Magazine, No. 7, page 29; December 1993.
Air & Cosmos, No. 1479, page 5;4th-lOth July 1994.
20.
21.
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dissemination of information and the third, equip-
ping the system with new satellites, improving the
frequency of passes, data-access time and resolu-
tion. The anticipated time-scale for completion of
the project, more or less in its entirety, is some
fourteen years at a cost ofF 16-20 billion.
76. Eurospace, which groups some thirty Euro-
pean firrns, has presented a programme for small
satellites. According to Eurospace, Europe is [ack-
ing in launchers suited to small satellites and this
gap mustbe filled to avoid this sectorbeing mono-
polised by competitors such as the United States.
The ESSMI (European small satellite missions)
project, although its aims are essentially commer-
cial (small, low-cost satellites are a potential mar-
ket, but one hampered by the lack of suitable laun-
chers) also has military dimensions, particularly in
relation to the projected observation systems (pro-
posed for WEU or by Eucosat), requfuing small
supporting satellites with flexible launch methods
according to need, in the event of crisis. However,
for the moment there are no firm projects in view,
either at state level or in ESA, because of financial
restrictionsz. In the United States, where the mar-
ket for small satellites is growing, the military
view is that they lend themselves to more flexible
use than the larger systems, as they can be laun-
ched quite quickly, for a specific mission, in the
event of crisis. A system of several small satellites
would also make it possible to mitigate the effects
of possible failure or destruction of the larger
observation and warning satellites 8.
IV Conclusians
77. Space Europe is a thriving and tangible rea-
lity. The launchers, satellite systems and techno-
logies that have been developed confirm the exis-
tence of means and know-how equal, if not
superior, to those of the other space powers. At
the same time, however, technological and com-
mercial success cannot mask one vital issue: the
absence of a European space policy, in both its
civilian and military dimensions.
78. The success of co-operation over the Ariane
rocket, the Spot and ERS-I earth observation
satellites for civil use and other programmes
(space probes, meteorological observation, ocean
research), is undeniable, despite the fact that cer-
tain major projects have been shelved for the time
being (for example, the Hermes shuttle). However
what is lacking overall is a long-term view and a
political and military analysis of the challenges
presented by the use of space.
79. Space is also an attribute of power, hence
the importance accorded to it by the United States,
22. Space News, Vol. 5, No. 22, page4;30th May-12th June
1994.
23. Space News, Vol. 5, No. 30, page 4; lst-7th August 1994.
Russia, France and other nations, such as China,
Japan'o and India. As the Prime Minister of
France, Mr. Edouard Balladur, stated, in space co-
operation " virtue and necessity coincide since
space is a particularly propitious area for building
defence Europe "5.
80. However, there is a wide gulf between fine
words and reality, as France's difficulties in
finding partners for its Helios II programme or in
associating Germany in the Osiris radar satellite
project bear witness. Yet both correspond to
a need which is not just national but European
too.
81. Differences of assessment and financial
restrictions mean that space Europe is taking
shape only with difficulty, particularly in the mili-
tary sphere. ln the absence ofco-operation and the
development of a space policy, albeit minimal,
efforts undertaken are likely to be affected by
short-term considerations, basically of a financial
order. Space is undoubtedly a high-cost area, it
mobilises technological and human resources
which may be lacking in other sectors, it is often
difficult for public opinion and indeed decision-
makers to grasp any other than the commerical
implications, yet the advantages deriving from its
use are out of all proportion with the results obtai-
ned by the use of more raditional methods.
82. The applications and usefulness of space-
based observation systems in armaments conffol,
monitoring proliferation, identifying targets and
in telecommunications is already proven, as testi-
fied by their intensive use during the Gulf crisis.
Today, in the face of manifold crises, from former
Yugoslavia to North Korea, space-based techno-
logy comes fully into its own, allowing virtually
day-to-day monitoring of the situation on the
ground, even where a direct presence is difficult
or impossible.
83. This being the case, the challenges must
frst be understood before proceeding further. The
high cost of space does not allow wastage at a
time when resources are increasingly scarce.
Although military and civilian dual-use equip-
ment allows savings to be made, the performance
and levels of protection of such equipment26 are
not identical. Furthermore, the missions initially
envisaged (disarmament control in Europe, for
example) have evolved and new uses of space are
opening up, in the area of anti-missile defence, for
example. Detection and early-warning satellites
24. Japan has recently embarked upon the study of a military
space-based observation and anti-missile early warning sys-
tem; Space News, Vol. 5, No. 30, page 4, lst-7th August
t994.
25. Address by Mr. Balladyr, Prime Minister of France, to
the Institut des Hautes Etudes de D6fense Nationale
(trIEDN), Paris, 8th September 1994.
26. Compare Spot's l0 m resolution with that planned for
Helios of 50 cm.
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are an essential element today for setting up an
efficient space-based observation system.
84. In the United States, where early-warning
duties were assigned to DSP (defence supporting
programme) system satellites, launched in the
1970s and now close to the limit of their operatio-
nal life, the Pentagon has just proposed a plan for
their replacement by more modern satellites, the
ALARM (alert locate and report missiles) system
to meet the threat of ballistic proliferation. Funds
have been allocated to this end by Congress in the
1995 defence budget2T and the first launches are
scheduled for around 2OO2-2W5.
85. Another factor which must be taken into
account is the possibility of the emergence in the
future of anti-satellite systems, based either on
advanced technologies or on less advanced equip
ment (scranrbling systems, use of laser technology).
An important debate is in progress in the United
States28, with crucial implications for the fuure of
any European space-based observation sysfem.
86. In a recent document from the American
Presidency, entitled " National security stategy
of engagement and enlargement ", reference is
made to the need for " deterring threats to United
States' interess in space and meeting aggression
[against space interests] if deterrence fails " 2e.
According to Mr. Dunbar Lockwood of the Arms
Control Association in Washington, the theaffe
high-altitude atea defence anti-missile system_
could be modified to intercept satellites instead of
missiless.
87. Another important area of action is that of
navigation by satellite. To date only the United
States and Russia have this system of space bea-
cons (Global NavStar and Glonass). These are
constellations of several satellites (roughly 24 in
either system) enabling users on the ground to
determine their exact positions on earth, on the
sea and in the air, to ascertain their speed and to
obtain time reference. During the Gulf crisis,
NavStar was extremely valuable for accurate mis-
sile launches, helping to adjust the trajectory of
the Tomahawk cruise missiles to which observa-
tion satellites had previously ffansmitted images
of the terrain the missiles would overfly3'.
88. With the proliferation of ballistic weapons,
particularly in the Mediterranean region, it is
becoming necessary to consider the need to
acquire an early warning satellite system if Euro-
pe is one day to have an efhcient anti-missile sys-
tem (whether from the south or the east, the time
between the departure and arrival of a missile in
Europe would be exfremely short 
- 
an argument
in favour of a system of detection from the
moment of ignition of the missile).
89. Any projected space-based observation
system must take account of these factors. More-
over, the area for discussion should perhaps be
widened to that of a European space-based defen-
ce system, including observation (optical and
radar) facilities, relay and communications satel-
lites (providing links between forces answerable
to WEU and those of the NAIO allies), a system
of navigation by satellite, an early-warning
system for anti-missile defence and a satellite
defence system32.
90. This space-based system would be comple-
ted by a ground sector data receiving station and
facilities for processing and transmission of data to
political and military decision-makers. Conventio-
nal means of detection, radar stations, land or sea
based or airborne (for example, on AWACS),
would be connected to the system allowing infor-
mation received to be handled more quickly.
91. To achieve this, it is necessary above all for
the major objectives of this system to be identified
and the military space-based requirements of all
the countries concerned to be co-ordinated. The
cost of a space-based defence system far exceeds
the resources of a single country and a joint space
policy is the only means of achieving its imple-
mentation. Recourse to technologies already in
use and developed in the context of the civilian
space sector, such as launchers, optical equip-
ment, radar and various types of sensors, allow
considerable savings to be made, in terms of
money and time. Nevertheless, it should not be
forgotten that the only European civil space orga-
nisation, ESA, has no responsibilities in defence
matters.
92. In order to manage the design and imple-
mentation of a European space-based defence
system, consideration might be given either to
grving ESA defence responsibilities (not an easy
approach, in view of the differing interests and
defence policies of the member counffies) or to
creating in WEU or between the European coun-
tries wishing to participate in such a system, a
space-based defence agency with responsibility
for supervising and co-ordinating efforts in this
32. This last point remains controversial but all options
should be considered, above all because of high costs, the
difficulty of replacing equipment rapidly and the wlnerabil-
ity of that equipment..
27. The total cost of the ALARM Projecq coupled with the
Brilliant Eyes satellite programme, led by the BMDO 
- 
Bal-
listic Missile Defence Gganisation 
- 
is estimated at $ll bil-
lion up to 2015; Space News, Vol. 5, No. 32, page 4, l5th-
28th Augusg 1994.
28. The White House is opposed to any operational develop-
ment ofan anti-satellite system but advocates.ofthe latter are
still continuing to press their case; Space News, Vol. 36, page
7, l9th-25th September 1994.
29. Defense News, Vol. 9, No. 37, page 2O, l9th-25th Sep-
tember 1994.
30. Idem.
31. La guerre en orbite, Serge Grouard, Ed. Economica,
page l2l.
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area, conducting studies on the requirements of
the system, making proposals and dealing with
the implementation of the decisions taken by the
participant states.
93. Alongside this technical-type structure,
consideration might be given to establishing a
European milita.ry space command, similar to the
United States Military Space Command, forrred
by the military authohti6s responsible for space
matters in the WEU countries or the countries par-
ticipating in the space-based defence system. The
space defence agency would also be responsible
for anti-missile defence in the context of early-
warning satellite systems.
94. There is doubtless a long way to go, but
defence Europe cannot afford not to engage in
serious thinking on the military uses of space if it
wishes to avoid remaining in a dependent and wl-
nerable position in military space matters. Space
is necessary for its existence as a power in its own
right, commanding credibility and respect, and
confident of being able to meet the challenges of
the future in its dealings with is adversaries and
also its allies.
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